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BASEBALL AND RACE: THE LIMITS OF COMPETITION

By
Neil J. Sullivan*

After the fiftieth anniversary of Jackie Robinson's breaking the color barrier, Major League Baseball (MLB) is an especially interesting industry for considering America's fitful pursuit of racial justice. In particular, the national pastime offers a cautionary tale for those who think that if markets are sufficiently free, everything worthwhile will fall into place.

Baseball has been an important part of the country's entertainment industry from the 1870s through its modern organization in 1903 up to the present day.[1] The game has followed population shifts to the suburbs and Sun Belt, fled the deterioration of downtown neighborhoods, scrambled to understand and to exploit the great technological breakthroughs in mass communications, and taken its players off the rails and into jets. And it was wrestling with race even before Cap Anson refused to let his Chicago White Stockings take the field against the integrated Newark Little Giants in 1887.[2]

In all of these transformations, baseball has been dear to America because, superficially, it has been guided by the principles of competition, a set of values that we confidently believe guides the individual exercise of personal freedom along lines of self interest to the benefit of the greater community.

This presumption about freedom and the common good is a powerful force in our culture, and it is supported by important scholarship. It lies at the heart of Robert Nozick's work on distributive justice.[3] Milton Friedman argues that individual liberty is the foundation of other values; for example, "A society that puts freedom first will, as a happy by-product, end up with both greater freedom and greater equality."[4] Peter Berger proposes that a refined individualism is necessary for the successful development of capitalism.[5] African-American scholars such as Thomas Sowell and Stephen Carter have expressed concerns about programs that focus on collective outcomes rather than individual opportunities. As Sowell has put it, " 'Equal justice for all' now means compensatory benefits for some—usually the more fortunate of those who share the political label 'disadvantaged.' "[6] Carter has challenged the notion that people of a particular race or gender necessarily have a common perspective that should be assured a place at the table.[7]

Baseball expresses these themes of individualism and competition through two powerful myths: in the culture of sports, we are taught that every effort consistent with sportsmanship must be spent to achieve victory. Similarly, in the culture of business,

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we learn that prosperity and profits must be pursued with a steady gaze, indifferent to sentimental impulses that could distract us from the balance sheet.

Sports and business both teach that competition forces us to perform our best. We run faster, leap higher, and make better widgets because, if we do not, someone else will win the prize or the market share. Cooperation is fine to a point—we sometimes need to work with others to maximize our efforts—but in the end, the competitive drive to win is the foundation of progress in our culture and our economy.

The original Adam Smith told us that we need not be bothered by considerations of the greater good. In his famous description of the individual in a market, "[H]e intends only his own gain; and in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention."[8] Individual gain in the case of baseball is easily measured—obvious economic benefits accrue to winning teams. Normally, the better teams attract more fans, are able to command more revenue from broadcasting, and are eligible for postseason play that generates still more income.

In addition to the financial returns, the always popular social climb is recorded with great precision. Never mind corner offices and other nuances of status, the nation's newspapers print which owners are up and which down every day. In baseball, keeping score is a literal exercise devoid of ambiguity.

The pursuit of money and status has been central to baseball from the time it left the gentlemen's clubs in the posh neighborhoods of Manhattan. Fail on the field, and you lose money and bragging rights. Everything we believe about competition, market forces, and ego says that nothing can be spared to send forth the best possible team.

Despite those pressures, from 1903-47, African-Americans were barred from playing in the recognized major and minor leagues of Organized Baseball.[9] Some of the greatest players in the history of the game were ignored even though they could have put money in the owners' pockets and moved clubs up in the standings.

When Jackie Robinson, Larry Doby, and Monte Irvin demonstrated in the late 1940s what black players could mean to a franchise, some teams were inspired to tap this neglected resource. Other clubs integrated only with the greatest reluctance.[10] Years after Willie Mays, Henry Aaron, and Ernie Banks arrived, the Philadelphia Phillies, Detroit Tigers, and Boston Red Sox were still all-white. The Red Sox resisted integrating until 1959, three years after Robinson retired.

The myths of competition are so powerful that the meaning of baseball's color barrier is slow to be grasped, but it was simply a preference for the comfort of shared prejudice over the rigors of a competitive market. General managers worked relentlessly to find one or two players who might improve their ball clubs. Scouts were sent to the most remote hamlets to verify rumors about a prospect. Money was invested in farm systems to nurture players for the big leagues. Coaches worked for hours on end to hone the skills of marginal major leaguers. Meanwhile, under the noses of the major league owners were dozens of the best players who ever lived, and they were available for the asking.

The injustice to black players who were deprived of major league opportunities is obvious and well documented.[11] Perhaps less obvious is the damage to the game and to specific teams who deprived themselves of improvement by their bigotry. The so-called Golden Age of Sports in the 1920s, for example, certainly included its genuinely heroic figures. But using the very standard of competition that our myths revere,

the achievements of Babe Ruth, Bobby Jones, and Bill Tilden are tainted because the competition was racially rigged. This delusion has especially affected our understanding of our national game because, prior to full integration, baseball was dominated for decades by a single organization.

While Clark Griffith, Walter Briggs, Horace Stoneham, Charles Comiskey, and the rest of the old guard of owners were occasionally putting terrific teams on the field, the New York Yankees were developing something unique in baseball. The Yankees were not simply a great team—the game had produced a number of great teams—the Yankees became a great organization that routinely produced great teams dominating baseball from 1920 to the mid 1960s.

Signing black players was the obvious move to challenge the Yankee dynasty, yet no organization seriously considered the step. Men who devoted their professional lives to winning, to beating their competition, to doing their best, and to making money routinely abandoned those goals to preserve the racist ban. The Yankees became one of the pre-eminent American businesses both prosperous and celebrated. The competitive myths would assume that other clubs would do whatever was necessary to catch the Yankees, but the myths are wrong.

One example of the self-defeating bigotry that permeated the major leagues was the Pittsburgh Pirates, who were a long time recovering from being swept in the 1927 World Series by a Yankee team that many consider the best ever. The Bucs would not win another pennant until 1960, but they came close several times during the 1930s. They finished four games behind the Cubs in 1932, four back of the Giants in 1933, and three behind the Cubs again in 1938.

Those three pennant runs were made with rather thin pitching. Larry French was the Pirate ace in the early 1930s, and, although he won 197 games in his career, he was dealt to the Cubs in 1934 after six seasons with Pittsburgh. None of the other Pirate pitchers of that era are particularly memorable. The team had a terrific offense, powered by the Waner brothers and Arky Vaughn. A couple of great pitchers might have made the club a dynasty.

The pitchers were available. Satchel Paige was only the most famous. Bullet Rogan was still pitching effectively during the 1930s.[12] Ted Trent is said to have struck out Bill Terry four times in an exhibition game.[13] Slim Jones and Bill Jackman are two other great pitchers of that period that author Robert Peterson notes as outstanding performers in the Negro League.[14]

Perhaps none of these pitchers would have brought a championship to Pittsburgh, but certainly they deserved a look. The problem with the Pirates' pitching staff during the 1930s was not the scarcity of talent, but the limitations of the Pirates' front office in signing the available talent. The executives' failure to see that Paige and Rogan might have brought glory to Forbes Field fatally limited the opportunities for the Pirates on the diamond.

The most egregious blunder by the Pirate brass during the 1930s was their inept pursuit of a catcher. Several men held the position for a few years, but none of them added much to the Pirate attack. In another part of town, playing for the Homestead Grays, was one of the great catchers of all time.

Josh Gibson could have been for the Pirates what Yogi Berra, Roy Campanella, and Johnny Bench were for their clubs: tremendous power hitters who were league

MVPs.[15] Any fair-minded person could quickly see what an injustice the color barrier was to Gibson, but what should also be appreciated is how destructive it was to the Pirates.

The Pirates were just one club that might have been dramatically better with a few black players. The Boston Red Sox was another team that sacrificed winning for bigotry. Consider its record during the 1930s:

YEAR	RECORD	FINISH	GAMES BEHIND	PENNANT WINNER
1930	52-102	8th	50	Philadelphia
1931	62-90	6th	45	Philadelphia
1932	43-111	8th	64	New York
1933	63-86	7th	34.5	Washington
1934	76-76	4th	24	Detroit
1935	78-75	4th	16	Detroit
1936	74-80	6th	28.5	New York
1937	80-72	5th	21	New York
1938	88-61	2nd	9.5	New York
1939	89-62	2nd	17	New York

Tom Yawkey's purchase of the club in 1933 brought the Sox back to a respectable level, and the arrivals of Jimmy Foxx in 1936, Bobby Doerr in 1937, and Ted Williams in 1939 improved the team significantly. It needed still more help to close on the Yankees of Joe DiMaggio, yet the front office passed up the players who might have rewritten the history of American League baseball.

Baseball's mythology casts a glow on the memory of Tom Yawkey that preserves him as a benevolent sportsman who was generous to his players, yet few would deny that Yawkey was similar in his racial attitudes to Ty Cobb who appeared comfortable with the white supremacist bias of his native Georgia.[16] Cobb's racism was obscured behind his vicious determination, and Yawkey's was subsumed beneath his kindly manner. Both men are remembered for their intense eagerness to win, yet Cobb's other vices and Yawkey's virtues can distract us from the fact that their bigotry was the common overriding reason why neither won the World Series title that each desperately wanted.

For much of its history the Red Sox have traded on a romantic mystique that the club is doomed. The "curse of Harry Frazee" who sold Babe Ruth to the Yankees is said to have kept great Bosox teams from championships. The few pennants have only resulted in frustrating World Series defeats.

The charms of rooting for the Red Sox have captivated some of baseball's most gifted apologists, including Bart Giamatti. The intellectuals invoke muses, angels, and perhaps the devil to explain the ghosts that haunt Fenway. But the simple truth of much of the team's misfortune is more profane: at least until the 1960s, championships eluded the Red Sox because they were committed to bigoted management.

Red Sox officials watched while Jackie Robinson, Henry Aaron, Willie Mays, and other black stars took their teams to another level. The Red Sox chased the Yankees through the 1940s and 1950s with a strong team which had some glaring deficiencies

that black players could have filled. They came up short not because they were doomed, but because they were blind to their own interests. During those years, the Red Sox suffered far less from fate than from their front office.

The Brooklyn Dodgers team has been assigned a heroic place in baseball history as the team that finally broke the color barrier, but the record of that franchise makes clear that the Dodgers were another organization that should have felt compelled to integrate long before it did. After its pennant winning season in 1920, the Dodgers struggled until 1941 before capturing another championship. It finished a game back of the Giants in 1924; otherwise they spent two decades trying to avert bankruptcy while the Giants contended for National League titles and the Yankees became a metaphor for excellence.

It should have been natural for the Dodgers to take the democratic step of dropping the color barrier back in the 1920s. The Yankees were the darlings of New York society, and the Giants were well heeled foes ensconced across the Harlem River in the Polo Grounds. The Dodgers did not outdraw the Giants in attendance until 1930, and the Bums trailed both the Giants and the Yankees at the gate thirty-one times during the years 1903-1938.[17] The team of the unappreciated borough of Brooklyn would never be followed by New York's swells, so why not pursue money and championships by taking the dramatic step of hiring great black players to leapfrog the competition?

The Cubs, Braves, White Sox, Indians, and Tigers are some of the other clubs in northern markets that should have seen how integration would have benefitted them. In fact the only club that profited from the racist ban was the Yankees who won while other teams settled for getting beaten in all-white comfort.

What are the reasons for bigotry being a stronger influence on baseball management than competition? Two possible explanations are easily rebuffed. First, the owners were not ignorant. Their players toured the country in post-season barnstorming games to make extra money.[18] These teams consisted of ad hoc rosters of major leaguers, minor league players, semi-pro clubs, company teams, young lads off the farm, and black players from teams in the Negro League.

Oscar Charleton, Smokey Joe Williams, Bullet Rogan, Jose Mendez, and other great African-American players competed against the likes of Ty Cobb, Tris Speaker, Walter Johnson and other stars of the American and National leagues. Stories about the great black players were well known, but the logical step of signing some to major league rosters was never taken.

John McGraw, the manager of the New York Giants from 1901-36, sought an edge by trying in 1901 to portray Frank Grant, a black man, as Charlie Tokohama, a Cherokee, but the ploy failed.[19] Thereafter, McGraw meekly complied with the custom that barred black players. McGraw never hesitated to challenge umpires and league executives when his club's interests were at stake, but he backed down on this issue. As passionately as McGraw wanted to win, he acceded to the racial bigotry of his time.

Despite their awareness of what African-Americans could mean, a serious obstacle to any owner who might have wished to sign a black player was Commissioner Kenesaw Mountain Landis. In his autobiography, *Veeck As In Wreck*, Bill Veeck writes that he paid a courtesy call on Landis in 1943 to relate his plans to buy the bankrupt Philadelphia Phillies and sign a number of black stars.[20] Before Veeck could close the

deal, the Phillies team was sold to William Cox, apparently because Landis was unalterably opposed to integrating baseball. But singling out Landis as the reason that the color barrier persisted is no more sufficient than singling out Cap Anson as the sole reason the ban was initiated in the first place. Landis had many strong opinions including his fierce opposition to the development of farm systems, but clubs persisted in buying minor league teams because they saw economic advantages to doing so. Similar advantages would have accrued to a club that would have been willing to defy Landis on racial integration.

Landis's passing did not release a pent-up enthusiasm for signing black players. When Branch Rickey proposed bringing Robinson to the Dodgers, he was opposed in a poll of the other clubs by a 15-1 vote.[21] The reluctance to sign black players persisted long after Landis's death and long after Jackie Robinson exposed the folly of the color barrier in his rookie season. While the Cleveland Indians, under Bill Veeck's ownership, and the St. Louis Browns both put black men on the field in July of 1947, no other club followed suit until 1949 when the Giants brought up Henry Thompson and Monte Irvin.[22] Sam Jethro broke the barrier for the Braves in 1950, and the White Sox traded for Minnie Minoso in 1951.

Five years after the color barrier was first broken, most of the major league clubs had never played a black man, and the 1952 season passed without any more progress. The impressive records that Robinson, Irvin, Mays, Campanella, and Don Newcombe had already established were less influential on the owners than the traditional and irrational attitude of the fraternity that no blacks need apply.

When the major league rosters expanded in September of 1953, the Cubs brought up Ernie Banks, and the Athletics signed their first black player. The 1954 season saw additional progress as the Pirates, Cardinals, Reds, and Yankees integrated in the spring, and the Senators came on board in September.

The die-hards included the Phillies who finally brought up John Kennedy for a cup of coffee in April of 1957 to complete the integration of the National League. The Detroit Tigers picked up Ossie Virgil from the Giants in June of 1958, and the Red Sox ended their holdout by signing Pumpsie Green who appeared in Fenway in July of 1959.

By 1950, Commissioner Landis was out of the picture, and the ability of blacks to compete was established, yet most teams were reluctant to integrate. Why?

Another possible explanation is that the owners feared a player revolt. In fact when Robinson was brought up, some Brooklyn Dodgers requested trades and were accommodated.[23] The St. Louis Cardinals are believed to have threatened a strike in 1947 when the Dodgers came to town, but a reprimand from the National League office ended the plan.[24] Plenty of white players were very unhappy about integration, but they were also unhappy about their pay, working conditions, managers, and other matters that the owners ignored.

The one plausible economic fear that might have troubled the owners was the concern that fans would not pay to see a black player, but the results from the 1950s suggest that those fears were unwarranted.

TEAM	ATTENDANCE AND FINISH[25]					
	YEAR BEFORE INTEGRATION			YEAR OF INTEGRATION*		
N.L.						
Dodgers	1946	1,796,824	1st	1947	1,807,526	1st
Giants	1948	1,459,269	5th	1949	1,218,446	5th
Braves	1949	1,081,795	4th	1950	944,391	4th
Cardinals	1953	880,242	3rd	1954	1,039,698	6th
Cubs	1953	763,658	7th	1954	748,183	7th
Pirates	1953	572,757	8th	1954	475,494	8th
Reds	1953	548,063	6th	1954	704,167	5th
Phillies	1956	934,798	5th	1957	1,146,230	5th
A.L.						
Indians	1946	1,057,289	6th	1947	1,521,978	4th
Browns	1946	526,435	7th	1947	320,474	8th
White Sox	1950	781,330	6th	1951	1,328,234	4th
Athletics	1953	362,113	7th	1954	304,666	8th
Yankees	1953	1,537,811	1st	1954	1,475,171	2nd
Senators	1954	503,542	6th	1955	425,238	8th
Tigers	1956	1,051,182	5th	1957	1,272,346	4th
Red Sox	1958	1,077,047	3rd	1959	984,102	5th

* If the player came up in September, the following year is counted as the first year of integration.

In the National League, the attendance for four teams increased while that for four teams declined. The finishes for six teams remained identical, improved for one club, and dropped for the other.

American League fans similarly were more affected by a club's performance than by skin color. Five teams saw their attendance drop while three saw their's improve. But those five also finished lower the next year while the remaining three clubs moved up in the standings.

A few of the figures are intriguing. The Browns' experiment to boost the crowds in 1947 through integration was a complete bust—a 40% drop. But in that same town where Jim Crow reigned in Sportsman Park, the Cardinals' attendance jumped 18% when they integrated a few years later.

In Boston the teams followed very different strategies with nearly identical results. The Braves team was one of the first teams to play a black man, and their attendance fell by 137,404. Nearly a decade later, the Red Sox attendance in its last all-white season was within four thousand of what the Braves' had been in 1949. The Bosox crowds slid the following year by 92,945.

The Indians' attendance jumped fifty percent during the team's first year, and it was the first club in the majors to top 2 million the year after that. But it was also improving significantly in the standings, and its attendance dropped in later years when its performance fell.

Perhaps before World War II, the integration of baseball would have provoked riots and boycotts, but the evidence from the 1950s indicates that fans were more interested in good baseball than in prejudices that weaken the game.

As the owners opened their minds to the prospect of hiring black players, both the sport and the business of baseball were historically affected. First, the game improved dramatically for an obvious reason. Professional baseball is played by men who, with few exceptions, are between the ages of twenty and forty. In 1950, the population of white males in America in their twenties and thirties was 20,449,808.[26] When the game was opened to black men in those same age groups, the number of potential ballplayers increased by 2,184,790. A more than ten percent growth in the eligible labor pool is especially significant since the rosters of major league clubs in 1950 totalled only four hundred players.

Even with the dilatory hiring practices of many teams, black players by the end of the 1950s had established beyond doubt that the game that preceded their arrival was an inferior product. Since the integration of baseball in 1947, the superstar status among players has been disproportionately dominated by black men. Despite the slow pace of integration during the 1950s, the principal offensive categories have been led by a black player an incredible number of times during that forty-four season span:

OFFENSIVE CHAMPIONSHIPS WON BY BLACK PLAYERS 1947-1996 (50 Years)[27]*

	NATIONAL LEAGUE	AMERICAN LEAGUE
Batting	34	16
Home Run	23	23
RBI	24	24
Runs Scored	26	20
Stolen Bases	47	34

* Bigotry is an inexact science. The table counts players who would have been barred from baseball if the pre-1947 standard had held. In the cases of some players of mixed ancestry, guesswork is required.

To see that blacks have won about half or more of the hitting and power titles in the National League and about one-third of the batting crowns and half of the run production leadership in the American League is enough to dispel any doubts about what they have brought to the game. But the numbers do not adequately convey how the addition of speed that Jackie Robinson reintroduced and that Maury Wills, Lou Brock, and Rickey Henderson have refined has transformed the game. Speed puts tremendous pressure on opposing pitchers and defenses. A walk is not just aggravating; it has become potentially decisive.

In the relatively brief time that blacks have been allowed in the major leagues, they have dominated not only the past forty years of baseball, but they have also established a remarkable record on the game's all-time lists. In the history of major league baseball, twenty-one batters have accumulated three thousand hits in their careers; seven of them are black. Thirty-five have driven in over fifteen hundred runs; eleven of the thirty-five are black. Fifteen have hit over five hundred home runs; seven of the

hitters are black. Since 1962, one-third of the recently retired players inducted into the Hall of Fame have been men who would not have been allowed on the field before 1947.[28]

When we think of how impoverished postwar baseball would have been without Willie Mays, Henry Aaron, Ernie Banks, Jackie Robinson, and Frank Robinson, we have to imagine what was lost to five decades of racism.[29] More than the spitball, Babe Ruth, day games, train travel or any other factor, baseball before 1947 was defined by racism. The great achievements of Cobb, Walter Johnson, Christy Mathewson, Lou Gehrig, and the other legends cannot rescue the era of bigotry from a tainted place in the game's history. Baseball certainly enjoyed great players and teams before 1947, but they were never tested as they might have been.

Does a review of a problem decades old in the baseball business shed much light on contemporary matters in American business and government? The argument here is that if business executives could ignore their own folly when it was printed daily in the box scores, how much easier must it be when the effects of injustice are more subtle.

No doubt, the earlier owners of baseball franchises thought that they were making sensible business decisions when they were engaged in their futile pursuit of the Yankees. One can imagine them in restaurants, clubs, and owners meetings celebrating the virtues of American capitalism, all the while ignoring one of its most basic tenets.

To return to an earlier point about the social and ethical dimensions of American business, we must note that free markets do not merely claim to reward the most industrious, determined, and fortunate individual. They promise something more: that all of us will benefit from the individual pursuit of self interest. Concerning ourselves directly with the common good is unnecessary, indeed suspect. Adam Smith speaks on the rational actor again: "By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the public good."[30]

This communal benefit, that would be so unconsciously conferred, rests on the validity of the assumptions about individual behavior: that individual freedom will be directed to enhancing self interest and that self interest will be promoted rationally. The staggering damage suffered by baseball undermines this confidence that individual freedom will necessarily translate into justice and the common good. We can readily see that players in the Negro League suffered economic and personal loss compared to what a truly free market would have yielded; but the harm that the perpetrators of injustice caused themselves is equally remarkable.

The pervasive injury from baseball's color barrier also undermines assumptions that policies such as affirmative action are zero sum games, that what is beneficial to one group is necessarily detrimental to another. The long-delayed integration of baseball—obviously good for Mays, Aaron, and Doby—gave fans a far better game than they had been seeing, which in turn enriched the owners through additional gate receipts and broadcast revenues.

The limitations of competitive forces to promote the public interest do not by themselves justify any particular kind of market intervention or public policy. Quotas, reverse discrimination, and other straw men need not detain us. These limitations do suggest that, even in the narrowest calculation of our own good, we should beware

another mindless drift into bigoted mediocrity. Baseball's history indicates that a conscious insistence on justice in our commercial transactions is not a privilege conferred on a single group but a prudent step in our national interest.

NOTES

[1] Scholarly works on the history of professional American baseball include: Harold Seymour, *Baseball: The Early Years*, (New York, 1961); *Baseball: The Golden Age*, (New York, 1971); David Q. Voight, *American Baseball* 3 vols. (University Park, PA., 1966-83); and Charles Alexander, *Our Game*, (New York, 1991).

[2] For an assessment of the story that identifies Adrian "Cap" Anson as the instigator of the color barrier see Robert Peterson, *Only the Ball Was White: A History of Legendary Black Players and All-Black Professional Teams* (New York, 1970), 29-30.

[3] Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State and Utopia* (New York, 1974).

[4] Milton and Rose Friedman, *Free to Choose* (New York, 1979), 148.

[5] Peter L. Berger, *The Capitalist Revolution: Fifty Propositions About Prosperity, Equality and Liberty* (New York, 1986), 213.

[6] Thomas Sowell, *Civil Rights: Rhetoric or Reality* (New York, 1984), 110.

[7] Stephen L. Carter, *Confessions of an Affirmative Action Baby* (New York, 1991), 195-211.

[8] Adam Smith, *An Inquiry Into The Nature and Causes of The Wealth of Nations* (New York, 1937), 423.

[9] Mark Ribowsky, *A Complete History of the Negro Leagues 1884 to 1955* (Secaucus, N.J., 1997).

[10] Merl Kleinknecht, "Integration of Baseball After World War II," *Baseball Research Journal* 1983, 100-06.

[11] In addition to Peterson, see, for example, Jules Tygiel, *Baseball's Great Experiment* (New York, 1985); Donn Rogosin, *Invisible Men: Life in Baseball's Negro Leagues* (New York, 1983), and John B. Holway, *Blackball Stars: Negro League Pioneers* (New York, 1988).

[12] Peterson, *Only the Ball*, 214-15.

[13] *Ibid.*, 219-20.

[14] *Ibid.*, 218-19.

[15] *Ibid.*, 158-70.

[16] Voigt, *American Baseball*, Vol. 3, 83.

[17] *The Sporting News: Complete Baseball Record Book*, 1997 Edition (St. Louis, 1997), 243-44, 283, 313-14.

[18] Rogosin, *Invisible Men*, 183.

[19] Charles Alexander, *John McGraw* (New York, 1988), 75.

[20] Bill Veeck, *Veeck As In Wreck* (New York, 1989), 171.

[21] Tygiel, *Baseball's Great Experiment*, 81.

[22] Kleinknecht, "Integration of Baseball," *op. cit.*

[23] Tygiel, *Baseball's Great Experiment*, 168-73.

[24] *Ibid.*, 185-88.

[25] *The Sporting News*, 207-338.

[26] Bogue J. Donald, *The Population of the United States: Historical Trends and Future Projections* (New York, 1985), 710-11.

[27] Data taken from David S. Neft and Richard M. Cohen, *The Sports Encyclopedia: Baseball*, 17th edition (New York, 1997), 680-87.

[28] *Ibid.*, 676-77.

[29] Allen Barra and Rob Neyer, "Baseball's Pre-1947 Greats Perhaps Weren't So Great," *The Wall St. Journal*, 4-18-97, B8.

[30] Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, 423.