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Scandal and Reform in Collegiate Athletics

Implications from a National Survey of Head Football Coaches

In recent times, increasing concern has been raised over the status of "big time" collegiate athletics. NCAA investigations have turned up widespread and often repeated instances of serious rule infractions. Cheating in the area of recruitment and payoffs by "boosters" to star players seem ubiquitous. Indeed, as of the early part of 1989, twenty-five institutions were under NCAA sanctions for "improper recruiting," "improper benefits to athletes," or similar forms of misconduct [2, p. A-40]. Most noteworthy, at Southern Methodist University, repeated and flagrant rule violations prompted the NCAA to impose on the university's football program the "death penalty" — a prohibition on the scheduling of games [9, 19]. The resulting national publicity triggered a pervasive and poignant reconsideration of the place of athletics within academia.

Other problems also plague collegiate sports. Revelations of athletes' drug use — ranging from alcohol to cocaine to steroids — have earned considerable media attention [1]. Inquiries into athletes' substance abuse reached a high point in the aftermath of the tragic, cocaine-related death of Len Bias, a Maryland basketball player. The NCAA has responded by subjecting athletes to a mandatory, random drug testing program. Though the policy has been challenged in the courts as an invasion of privacy, a recent United States District Court decision deemed the testing program constitutionally sound [13].

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Many within the academic community, moreover, have recoiled at the sight of players whose lack of basic skills and commitment to learning make a mockery of the term "student-athlete" [8]. The passage of NCAA Bylaw 5-1-J, known best by the label "Proposition 48," emerged as a controversial attempt to mandate for entering collegiate athletes minimum, acceptable levels of academic performance [14, 24, 25].

Although turmoil and scandal are seemingly ever-present, it remains unclear whether in recent years problems within the athletic community have grown worse or only have received more critical scrutiny, particularly in the press [cf. 17]. In any case, one advantage can be reaped from the prevailing mood: the time appears ripe to explore reforms that can diminish corruption within and strengthen the integrity of collegiate athletics [3, 23].

We are persuaded, however, that the success of such a reform movement will hinge to a large degree on whether systematic efforts are made to listen to those closest to the problem: the head coaches. They are typically most responsible for insisting that a "clean" program be run or, alternatively, for tolerating, if not encouraging, corrupt practices. Even so, apart from a few celebrated coaches who have voiced their views, we have little information on what the broad spectrum of coaches believes are the sources of and most effective remedies for the problems they face on a daily basis.

To secure such needed information, we surveyed NCAA Division I head football coaches regarding their views on "cheating" (rule violations), drug abuse, and the academic status of collegiate athletes. We chose for our sample football coaches, because collegiate football is (along with basketball) the major revenue-producing sport at most universities and a domain which has been burdened by the most serious forms of misconduct. Some caution should be exercised, however, in interpreting the perceptions of coaches, regardless of the sport in question. Their perceptions reflect a limited range of experiences and are vulnerable to being shaped by occupational interests. Even so, as "insiders," coaches have access to knowledge that is beyond the reach of "outside" observers, and thus their views merit consideration [12].

Methods

Subjects

In the summer of 1987, surveys were distributed to the 192 head football coaches at programs categorized by the NCAA as Division

I-A and I-AA. The sample received an initial mailing, a follow-up reminder letter, and, if necessary, a second follow-up contact. In all, 122 coaches returned the questionnaire, a response rate of 63.5 percent. The sample's characteristics are contained in table 1.

Measures

Our questionnaire focused on four areas that have received considerable attention in academic and popular forums: (1) coaches' views on the prevalence of, causes of, and proposed strategies to control violations of NCAA regulations; (2) coaches' views on the prevalence, causes, and control of drug abuse among college athletes; (3) coaches' views on academic reforms within collegiate athletics; and (4) coaches'

TABLE 1
Demographic and Background Characteristics of NCAA Head Football Coaches
Sample ($N = 122$)

Mean age	45.9
Race	
Black	8.4%
White	91.6%
Mean number of years head coach on the college level	8.3
Mean number of years assistant coach on the college level	9.8
Mean number of years head coach at current institution	4.7
Undergraduate major	
Physical education/health	48.8%
Other	52.2%
Discipline of Masters Degree ($N = 84$; 68.9% of sample)	
Physical education/health	45.2%
Education	22.6%
Administration (general/educational/athletic)	11.9%
Other	20.3%
Number with Doctoral Degrees (7.4% of sample)	9.0
Present head coaching record	
Mean number of wins	29.1
Mean number of losses	19.6
Mean number of ties	0.9
Career head coaching record	
Mean number of wins	52.3
Mean number of losses	32.4
Mean number of ties	1.5
Coaching record past season	
Mean number of wins	5.9
Mean number of losses	5.5
Mean number of ties	0.2
Mean attendance at home football games	25,072.7
NCAA division of coaches' universities	
I-A	49.2%
I-AA	50.8%
Percentage of coaches whose universities are CFA members	46.2%

views on reforming NCAA regulations. A more detailed presentation of the specific questions asked on these issues is contained in the text to follow and in tables 2 to 6.

Results

Violations of NCAA Regulations

Table 2 presents data on the coaches' estimates of the prevalence of cheating, views of ethical standards of other coaches, and reasons given for why cheating occurs. Several conclusions appear warranted.

First, to obtain an assessment of the prevalence of infractions, the respondents were asked to estimate the percentage of Division I football programs that commit "serious" violations. Table 2 reports the mean percentage of violations that were believed to take place. Although the coaches stated that the majority of programs complied with NCAA standards, they felt that a sizable proportion of programs abused regulations. Thus, on average, the coaches estimated that nearly a third of Division I football programs "cheat on a regular basis," and that almost half of the programs had "committed at least one serious violation in the past five years."

Second, over 70 percent of the respondents stated that when abuses take place, coaches "nearly all the time" or "most of the time" know that cheating is occurring but "choose to look the other way." Yet, despite the view that cheating is generally tolerated and fairly widespread, over 70 percent of the coaches also responded that "nearly all" or "most" of their colleagues heading Division I programs "are very honest and have very high ethical standards."

Some clue to untangling this apparent contradiction — cheating despite coaches being honest — can be gained from the final set of responses reported in table 2, which presents the sample's answers to an open-ended question asking what they thought were "the three major reasons" why cheating occurred. The coaches gave a variety of answers that were coded and then grouped into several broad categories. As table 2 reveals, only a small minority (5.1 percent) believed that the roots of serious rule infraction could be traced to flaws in the character of coaches. Instead, the respondents argued that, in essence, the source of cheating was structural: the intense "pressure to win" that is inherent in the role of a head coach. In short, the sample appeared to suggest that corruption is not the result of a few bad apples but of a barrel that is capable of discoloring even the choicest of apples.

Proposals to Curb Violations of NCAA Regulations

The survey asked the coaches to express the extent (a little, somewhat, a great deal) to which they supported or opposed each of four-

TABLE 2

Coaches' Estimates of Prevalence of Cheating, Views of Ethical Standards of Other Coaches, and Reasons Given for Why Cheating Occurs

Estimates of Prevalence of Cheating

- | | |
|--|-------|
| 1. Mean percentage of Division I football programs believed to commit serious violations— that is, cheat—on a regular basis. | 31.7% |
| 2. Mean percentage of Division I football programs believed to have committed at least one serious violation in the past five years. | 49.6% |

Views of Head Football Coaches' Ethics

- | | |
|--|-------|
| 1. Extent to which coaches believe that at universities where NCAA violations are occurring, Head Coaches in general are aware that cheating is taking place at their universities (e.g., pay-offs to players) but choose to "look the other way." | |
| Nearly all the time | 26.9% |
| Most of the time | 46.2% |
| Sometimes | 26.1% |
| Never | 0.8% |
| 2. Extent to which coaches believe that coaches at Division I football programs are very honest and have very high ethical standards. | |
| Nearly all (are honest) | 10.8% |
| Most | 62.5% |
| Some | 21.7% |
| Few | 5.0% |

Major Reasons Why Serious Violations Occur

- | | |
|---|-------|
| 1. First most important reason why violations occur. | |
| Pressure to win | 67.2% |
| Boosters/alumni | 9.2% |
| To keep job | 6.7% |
| Coaches' character | 5.1% |
| Money | 4.2% |
| Other | 7.6% |
| 2. Second most important reason why violations occur. | |
| Pressure to win | 27.6% |
| Boosters/alumni | 13.8% |
| To keep job | 12.1% |
| Coaches' ego | 7.8% |
| Money | 6.9% |
| Others are doing it | 6.0% |
| Problems with NCAA rules | 4.3% |
| To attract recruits | 4.3% |
| Lack of ethics | 3.4% |
| Other | 13.8% |
| 3. Third most important reason why violations occur. | |
| Pressure to win | 21.3% |
| Boosters/alumni | 19.1% |
| To keep job | 5.3% |
| Problems with NCAA rules | 5.4% |
| Others are doing it | 5.3% |
| Media pressure | 3.2% |
| Other | 40.4% |

teen proposals to curb the serious violation of NCAA regulations. The coaches' responses are contained in table 3.

Table 3 reveals widespread coaches' support for each of the fourteen

TABLE 3
Percentage of Coaches Supporting Proposals to Curb "Cheating" or the Serious Violation of NCAA Regulations

Proposal	Support*	Oppose+
<i>Proposals to Penalize Team/University</i>		
1. Banning teams who violate regulations from post-season play.	97.5%	2.5%
2. Taking scholarships away from teams that violate regulations.	98.3%	1.7%
3. Barring teams who violate NCAA regulations from appearing on television.	97.5%	2.5%
4. Actually invoking the "death penalty": eliminating or totally suspending a football team at universities that have repeatedly violated NCAA regulations.	77.7%	22.3%
<i>Proposals Involving Head Coaches</i>		
1. Including a stipulation in the contracts of coaches that they will be fired if serious violations of NCAA regulations occur.	95.0%	5.0%
2. Implementing an NCAA rule that if a coach changes positions and leaves his previous university on "probation," that this probation would go with the coach to the new position (that is, the university that hired the coach would also be placed on the same NCAA probation which had been given to the former university).	76.0%	24.0%
3. Provide head coaches with the possibility to earn tenure at a college.	97.5%	2.5%
4. Enforcing a code of ethics that makes it the professional responsibility of coaches to report any cheating that they believe to have taken place at another university.	84.3%	15.7%
<i>Proposals Involving Players</i>		
1. Suspending players who take pay-offs from games	99.2%	0.8%
2. Pay players a monthly stipend (e.g., \$60), so that they will have money on which to live.	62.8%	37.2%
<i>Proposals Involving Internal University Regulation</i>		
1. Greater supervision of athletic departments by university officials.	75.0%	25.0%
2. Not allowing boosters to have contact with recruits/athletes except at functions supervised by the head coach or authorized university personnel (e.g., faculty).	81.8%	18.2%
<i>Proposals Involving External Regulation</i>		
1. Increase the NCAA staff that investigates cheating.	82.5%	17.5%
2. Ask state legislatures to pass laws that make it a criminal offense, punishable by fine and/or imprisonment, for a person to give, receive, or conspire to encourage pay-offs to student-athletes.	70.8%	29.2%

*Includes responses "support a little," "support somewhat," "support a great deal."

+Includes responses "oppose a little," "oppose somewhat," "oppose a great deal."

policies. Accordingly, it appears that they are calling for a multi-dimensional approach to reducing cheating. Several details are worth noting.

First, nearly all coaches expressed support for imposing on violators traditional NCAA sanctions such as banning post-season play, reducing scholarships, and barring television appearances. Though support diminished somewhat, over three-fourths of the coaches endorsed the use of the "death penalty" (elimination of a university's football team) for chronic offenders.

Second, the respondents also favored reforms aimed at head coaches. Interestingly, they embraced measures that would punish directly the wayward members of their profession. Thus, they supported stipulating in coaches' contracts that cheating would lead to dismissal, and they felt that coaches who leave a university on NCAA probation should not escape unscathed but should carry this probation to their new job. The respondents saw value as well in enforcing a code of ethics mandating that when coaches observe other universities' misconduct, they must report these offenders to the NCAA. Further, nearly all coaches endorsed the concept of head coaches having the opportunity to earn tenure at a university. Presumably, the sample felt that tenure would help to insulate coaches from the intense pressures to win.

Third, almost every respondent advocated suspending from competition players who "take pay-offs." Less consensus existed on whether, in addition to their current scholarships covering tuition and room/board, players should receive an extra monthly stipend for daily living expenses. Even so, over 60 percent of the sample supported this proposal — on the belief, we suspect, that such payments would diminish the need to acquire spending money through illegal means.

Fourth, the sample generally supported proposals to tighten regulations both within the university (on athletic departments, on boosters) and outside the university (larger NCAA staff of investigators). Notably, over 70 percent of the coaches even favored the policy of making it a criminal offense to engage in schemes in which student-athletes are given pay-offs.

Drug Abuse in Collegiate Athletics

Table 4 reports the coaches' views on the seriousness, causes, and control of drug abuse among student-athletes. The data suggest several conclusions.

First, a majority of the sample stated that marijuana, cocaine, steroids, and alcohol constituted a "very serious" or "serious" problem for

TABLE 4

Coaches' Views on Drug Abuse in Collegiate Athletics

Extent to Which Coaches Believe a Substance Represents a Problem for College Football Players

1. Marijuana	
Very serious problem	19.2%
Serious problem	45.8%
A little serious	25.0%
Not very serious	10.0%
2. Cocaine	
Very serious problem	20.8%
Serious problem	35.0%
A little serious	30.0%
Not very serious	14.2%
3. Steroids	
Very serious problem	28.7%
Serious problem	42.6%
A little serious	22.1%
Not very serious	6.6%
4. Alcohol	
Very serious problem	45.0%
Serious problem	39.2%
A little serious	14.2%
Not very serious	1.7%

Major Reasons Why Coaches Believe Drug Use—Marijuana and Cocaine Use—Occurs Among College Athletes

1. First most important reason why drug use occurs.	
Peer pressure/be part of crowd	64.6%
Drugs part of society/college	13.0%
Fun/feels good/thrill	5.2%
Availability of drugs	3.4%
Other	13.8%
2. Second most important reason why drug use occurs.	
Peer pressure/be part of crowd	28.7%
Fun/feels good/thrill	14.9%
Drugs part of society/college	8.5%
Availability of drugs	7.4%
Pressure of college life	6.4%
Don't realize consequences	5.4%
Escape reality	5.3%
Lack of drug education	5.3%
Used drugs before college	3.2%
Think will improve performance	3.2%
Other	11.7%

Coaches' Views on Controlling Drug Use Among College Athletes

1. Support for the policy of drug testing for college athletes.	
Favor very strongly	74.6%
Favor somewhat	16.9%
Oppose somewhat	2.5%
Oppose very strongly	5.9%
2. What should be done to an athlete detected—for the first time—to have used drugs?	
Given a warning and allowed to play	14.9%
Made to receive drug treatment and allowed to play	66.7%
Declared ineligible for remainder of season	14.9%
Declared ineligible for remainder of career	3.5%
3. What should be done to an athlete detected—for the second time—to have used drugs?	
Given a warning and allowed to play	5.3%
Made to receive drug treatment and allowed to play	16.8%
Declared ineligible for remainder of season	53.1%
Declared ineligible for remainder of career	24.8%

TABLE 4 *Continued**Coaches View of Effects of Media Attention on Drugs*

1. The media attention has been beneficial because it has focused attention on a problem that needs to be addressed.	77.3%
2. The media attention has hurt college athletics because it has blown the "drug problem" way out of proportion.	22.7%

college football players. Although concern was voiced in regard to each substance, it is instructive that the coaches felt that alcohol abuse was the most serious problem, followed in turn by the use of steroids.

Second, in an open-ended question, the sample was asked what they believed were "the two major reasons why drug use (marijuana and cocaine) occurs among college athletes." When the written responses to these questions were coded and grouped into categories, they revealed that the coaches attributed drug abuse primarily to peer pressure and to the general existence of drugs in society and on college campuses. Accordingly, it seems that the coaches were suggesting that problems of substance abuse within college athletics would not be addressed successfully until the wider social causes of these problems are solved.

Third, we also asked the sample about their views on controlling drug use among college athletes. It is noteworthy that nearly three-fourths of the coaches favored "very strongly" the policy of "drug testing for college athletes," apparently on the belief that testing's deterrent effects outweighed the financial costs of conducting the tests and the concerns voiced over athletes' privacy rights. As table 4 suggests, the coaches also believed that first-time offenders and recidivists should be treated differentially. Thus, for those detected using drugs for the first time, the coaches favored efforts to mandate drug treatment while allowing the players to remain on the team. In contrast, for those detected a second time, the coaches endorsed the more punitive response of declaring the players ineligible.

Finally, we included questions that asked the respondents to assess the effects of the media attention given recently to athletes' drug use. Over three-fourths of the coaches stated that this attention not only had not been exaggerated but also had served usefully to illuminate the dangers of athletes' substance abuse.

Academic Problems and Reforms

In light of the controversy over graduation rates and athletes' academic problems, as well as over the reform of "Proposition 48," we

asked several questions aimed at tapping coaches' views of these issues. Table 5 presents the coaches' responses to these questions.

First, as noted previously, "Proposition 48" was an attempt by the NCAA to preclude entering freshmen from athletic eligibility unless they had demonstrated the academic skills necessary to undertake college-level studies. Accordingly, this rule banned athletes from playing in their freshman year unless they had earned a 2.0 high school average (overall and in core academic subjects) and had achieved a 700 combined score on the SAT or composite 15 score on the ACT [24, 25]. Despite the controversy over this policy — particularly over the potential racial bias in the use of standardized test scores — fully 85.7 percent

TABLE 5
Coaches' Views of Academic Status of College Athletes

<i>Support for Academic Reforms</i>	
1. Extent to which coaches favor "Proposition 48."	
Very strongly favor	37.0%
Favor	48.7%
Oppose	9.2%
Very strongly oppose	5.0%
2. Extent to which coaches favor proposal to eliminate freshman eligibility.	
Very strongly favor	12.5%
Favor	16.7%
Oppose	23.3%
Very strongly oppose	47.5%
3. Extent to which coaches favor proposal to base the number of scholarships a program receives on the number of athletes that secure their degrees.	
Very strongly favor	6.7%
Favor	19.2%
Oppose	40.8%
Very strongly oppose	33.3%
<i>Major Reason Given by Coaches Why Student-Athletes Do Not Graduate</i>	
Most important reason.	
Lack of motivation/interest in school	28.1%
Don't belong in college/not capable of work	24.6%
Student has wrong priorities	14.9%
Professional sports	7.9%
Poor direction/not monitored properly	6.1%
Poor habits from high school	3.5%
Other	14.9%
<i>Major Change Coaches Favor to Insure That Athletes Complete Their College Education</i>	
Most important change.	
Extend scholarships to five or six years	19.3%
Make coach and athletic department responsible for graduation rate	19.2%
Counseling/tutoring/monitoring	13.5%
Stress importance of education to athlete	10.6%
Postpone pro sports until one year after senior year	8.7%
Summer scholarships	7.7%
Other	21.0%

of the sample favored "Proposition 48." Even so, a clear majority of the coaches opposed more stringent academic proposals such as eliminating altogether freshman eligibility and linking a team's allotment of scholarships to the number of its athletes who earn a college degree. Ostensibly, coaches support policies that tighten admissions standards but not those which have the potential to alter substantially the pool of scholarship players.

Second, in line with their support of stricter entrance standards, the coaches' responses to an open-ended question indicated that they felt that the major reason why student-athletes do not graduate is that they either lack motivation or the basic skills to do academic work.

Third, when asked an open-ended question on what change they favored to increase athletes' graduation rates, they tended to endorse two types of reforms: (1) proposals that would extend the institution's financial aid support of athletes by lengthening scholarships to five or six years and by providing summer scholarships; and (2) more consistent efforts on the part of coaches and athletic departments to stress to players the importance of education and to supervise closely their academic progress.

Reforming NCAA Regulations

Table 6 reports the coaches' views on reforming NCAA regulations. As the responses to question 1 in table 6 reveal, 93 percent of the sample "favored" or "favored strongly" naming a "committee to rewrite and reform" NCAA regulations, because they were "too technical." Similarly, when asked in an open-ended question what "one change in

TABLE 6
Coaches' View on Reforming NCAA Regulations

1. Because NCAA regulations are too technical, support naming committee to rewrite and reform the regulations.	
Favor strongly	59.1%
Favor	33.9%
Oppose	6.1%
Oppose very strongly	0.9%
2. If you could suggest any one change in the NCAA regulations, what would it be?	
Revise or simplify rules/use common sense	41.2%
Increase punishments for rule violations	10.3%
Apply rules evenly to all universities	6.8%
Communicate with and listen to coaches	4.6%
Create system to help recruits make the right choice on what university to attend	3.4%
Other	33.7%

NCAA regulations" they would suggest, the most prevalent answer given by the coaches was that the regulations should be simplified and reflect "common sense." Notably, these responses indicate that the legitimacy of NCAA regulations may be undermined by the coaches' perception that the code of rules is too complex and rigid to be strictly obeyed.

Discussion

Survey research has the distinct advantage of being a cost effective means of securing information on a number of issues from a large sample. The risk of using surveys, however, is that it is difficult to probe beneath the surface to capture the complexities and nuances of subjects' views. Accordingly, we do not claim that the reported results represent in full detail the reactions of head football coaches to the problems confronting college athletics.

Nevertheless, we are persuaded that the data reported here are useful in painting in broad brush a portrait of the basic views of coaches. As noted above, we believe that the results of this national survey allow us to learn more about what coaches believe causes serious rule violations, drug abuse, and academic failure and what they believe might be the most prudent ways of addressing these problems. This information is important, because coaches are close to the problems and will be instrumental to any successful reform effort.

On a broad level, it is significant to learn that coaches see the need for and seem prepared to stand behind efforts to improve the integrity of collegiate athletics. Thus, the respondents admitted readily that college football was burdened by serious cheating, by substance abuse, and by students often unmotivated and unable to complete undergraduate course requirements. They also endorsed an array of reformative actions: stringent sanctions on wayward universities, players, and themselves; increased regulation of athletic departments and of boosters; the criminalization of pay-offs to players; drug testing and treatment; media attention to the drug problem; and Proposition 48. At least philosophically, coaches are less likely to be an obstacle to reform and more likely will be a valuable resource in a movement to reduce prevailing abuses within the athletic community.

Though this conclusion is heartening, the survey results also raise a disquieting issue. Consistent with the claims of outside observers [5, pp. 122-23; 10, pp. 117-19; 16; 21], the coaches cautioned that much cheating and corruption can be traced to the intense pressures to win

under which they labor. This insight suggests that the prevalence of corruption is not due simply to individual ethical failings but to structural pressures that erode moral mandates and lead coaches to tolerate minor, if not major, abuses. In this light, it becomes more understandable why the coaches in the sample opposed reforms that would potentially jeopardize their ability to sustain a successful program or to transform quickly a losing into a winning team (for example, eliminating freshman eligibility, linking scholarship levels to graduation rates).

The pressure to win, moreover, is fueled by the large economic stakes inherent in major collegiate athletics. From an occupational standpoint, coaches occupy a high risk, but potentially lucrative, position. Although typically granted little job security, coaches draw not only substantial salaries but also a myriad of fringe benefits (for example, radio-television contracts, endorsements, paid speaking engagements, summer sports camp) — a total financial package often in excess of \$200,000 [18, 22]. The incentives for shading rules in the pursuit of success are clear and considerable.

The stakes are also high for the coaches' institutions. Successful programs can accrue large profits through sizable crowds, television contracts, and post-season play. Even so, administering a major program consumes substantial resources, and many universities lose money on their "revenue-producing" sports [6, p. 63]. According to Frey [6], moreover, a number of circumstances (for example, inflation, rising insurance premiums, reduced legislative appropriations) have coalesced in the 1980s to worsen the economic strains on many institutions. These economic realities encourage a reliance on rich, generous boosters and diminish the tolerance for retaining coaches of losing, unprofitable programs.

It is instructive that writings in the sociology of deviance and crime have long suggested that conditions such as these are conducive to widespread misconduct. In 1938 Robert K. Merton cautioned that an intense emphasis on success goals attainable only by a limited segment of the population erodes the power of norms to regulate behavior ("anomie" prevails) and creates powerful pressures for the commission of deviant acts [11; cf. 10, pp. 116–26]. More recently, students of white-collar crime have revealed how pressures for profits prompt "respectable" executives to engage in corporate practices that rob the public of funds and endanger their health and safety [4, 7, cf. 15].

These observations hold implications for the ability of proposed reforms to curb deviance within college sports. Because the sources of much cheating and corruption are inherent in the very organization of

collegiate athletics, reforms will be truly effective only if they can penetrate to and change these structural conditions. Making NCAA sanctions more severe may have marginal benefits, but deterring those contemplating misconduct is a complex issue and typically depends more on the certainty than the severity of punishment [20, pp. 484–88]. As the SMU scandal reveals, even the prospect of a program's abolition through the "death penalty" may be ineffective in halting a long-standing, deeply rooted pattern of rule violations [9].

In the end, reducing misconduct will depend on implementing reforms that diminish the persistent, intense pressures on coaches to win and accrue profits for their universities. To date, however, as Weistart [23, p. 15] notes, "little or nothing has been done to address the fundamental cause of the recent scandals — the competitive pressures created by commercialization." We recognize that a call to refashion fully collegiate athletics is unlikely to be heeded, but it seems incumbent on the NCAA member institutions to consider strategies for mitigating the structural roots of the behaviors they decry. One possibility would be to explore the ways to increase coaches' job security, such as through granting tenure or honoring long-term contracts. In a like vein, Weistart [23, pp. 16–17] has asserted that the financial forces underlying "win-at-any-cost" practices might be curtailed through revenue-sharing programs similar to those used by professional sports leagues (for example, equal sharing of television revenues), which minimize the economic risks of not winning. In any case, the challenge is to take seriously the coaches' message — expressed clearly in our survey — that they find themselves in circumstances that create powerful incentives to "do what it takes" to produce a "successful" program.

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